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17 **UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT**  
18 **CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA, SOUTHERN DIVISION**

19 JOHN C. EASTMAN,

20 *Plaintiff,*

21 vs.

22 BENNIE G. THOMPSON, *et al.*

23 *Defendants*

24 Case No.: 8:22-cv-00099-DOC-DFM

25 **MOTION TO RECONSIDER OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE FOR A  
STAY PENDING APPEAL**

John Eastman, through undersigned counsel, respectfully asks this Court to reconsider it's October 19, 2022 order (ECF 372), or in the alternative to stay enforcement of the order pending appeal to the United States Circuit Court for the

1 Ninth Circuit, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 62(c). In support of this motion, he asserts  
2 the following:

3 **BACKGROUND**

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5 On October 19 this Court ordered Plaintiff to produce a number of emails  
6 pursuant to the crime fraud exception. ECF 372. Dr. Eastman respectfully submits  
7 that the relevant context shows that this ruling was clearly erroneous. For the  
8 reasons set forth below, the Court’s ruling should be corrected either through  
9 reconsideration or appeal.  
10

11 **ARGUMENT**

12 **I. This Court Should Reconsider its October 19 Order**

13 Local Rule 7-18(c) allows for reconsideration in cases of “a manifest  
14 showing of a failure to consider material facts.” In its October 19 order, this Court  
15 ordered several emails produced under the crime fraud privilege exception  
16 pursuant to a finding that “President Trump knew that the specific numbers of  
17 voter fraud [included in a federal court filing] were wrong but continued to tout  
18 those numbers, both in court and in the public.” ECF 372 at 17. Dr. Eastman  
19 submits that the full email record clearly shows that the President’s lawyers took  
20 great care to ensure all court filings were accurate. The Court also held that a few  
21 emails “make clear that President Trump filed certain lawsuits not to obtain legal  
22 relief, but to disrupt or delay the January 6 congressional proceedings through the  
23 courts.” ECF 372 at 15. Dr. Eastman submits that the full email record  
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1 demonstrates that the legal filings were all designed to obtain a ruling from the  
2 court on the contested election challenges.

3           Included with this filing is an affidavit<sup>1</sup> which identifies specific documents  
4 previously submitted for the court's *in camera* review that explain the true import  
5 of the email record surrounding the Presidential certification submitted in  
6 connection with *Trump v. Kemp*, 511 F.Supp. 3d 1325, 1330 (N.D. Ga. 2021) and  
7 the purpose for the filing of the complaint in that case. Ex. 1. The affidavit and  
8 referenced documents clearly show that no false information was knowingly  
9 submitted by the President or his attorneys, and that the complaint was not filed for  
10 an improper purpose.  
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13 **II. In the Alternative, this Court Should Grant a Stay of the October 19**  
14 **Order Pending Appeal**

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16 **a. Legal Standard**

17           Four factors govern stays pending appeal: “(1) whether the stay applicant has  
18 made a strong showing that he is likely to succeed on the merits; (2) whether the  
19 applicant will be irreparably injured absent a stay; (3) whether issuance of the stay  
20 will substantially injure the other parties interested in the proceeding; and (4) where  
21 the public interest lies.” *Hilton v. Braunskill*, 481 U.S. 770, 776 (1987); *see also*  
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<sup>1</sup> Because the affidavit includes the content of communications that this Court has  
25 held to be privileged, in is submitted *in camera*.

1 *Golden Gate Rest. Ass'n v. City & Cnty. of San Francisco*, 512 F.3d 1112, 1115 (9th  
2 Cir. 2008). The same standard applies to district courts applying Civil Rule 62(c) as  
3 appellate courts applying Appellate Rule 8. *Hilton*, 481 U.S. at 776

4  
5 These factors are not rigid, rather they operate on a continuum. Thus, the  
6 Ninth Circuit has formulated two alternative tests to show a stay is warranted. The  
7 first, drawn from the injunctive relief standard, requires the moving party to show:  
8 “(1) a strong likelihood of success on the merits, [and] (2) the possibility of  
9 irreparable injury to plaintiff if preliminary relief is not granted[.]” *Golden Gate*  
10 *Rest. Ass'n*, 512 F.3d at 1115–16 (alterations in original) (quoting *Natural Res. Def.*  
11 *Council, Inc. v. Winter*, 502 F.3d 859, 862 (9th Cir. 2007)). The second requires the  
12 moving party to “demonstrate that serious legal questions are raised and that the  
13 balance of hardships tips sharply in its favor.” *Id.* at 1116 (quoting *Lopez v. Heckler*,  
14 713 F.2d 1432, 1435 (9th Cir. 1983)).

15  
16 On this sliding scale, the more concrete the irreparable harm, the less weight  
17 is placed on possibility of success on the merits. *Id.* Conversely, “the required degree  
18 of irreparable harm increases as the probability of success decreases.” *Id.* (quoting  
19 *Winter*, 502 F.3d at 862). Additionally, this Court must “consider ‘where the public  
20 interest lies’ separately from and in addition to ‘whether the applicant [for stay] will  
21 be irreparably injured absent a stay[.]’” *id.* (alterations in original) (quoting *Winter*,  
22 502 F.3d at 863 (itself quoting *Hilton*, 481 U.S. at 776)).  
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1 As discussed below, Dr. Eastman can demonstrate every element and meet  
2 both standards.

3 **b. All Factors Weigh in Favor of a Stay of this Court’s October 19 Order**

4 **i. Likelihood of Success on the Merits**

5 As stated above, we have submitted an *in camera* affidavit in connection with  
6 this filing which provides critical context for the emails at issue. We respectfully  
7 submit that in light of this context the Court’s crime-fraud ruling is clearly erroneous.  
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9 **ii. Irreparable Harm**

10 Disclosure of privileged information is itself and irreparable injury. Once  
11 privileged communications are disclosed, that disclosure is permanent. As one court  
12 explained:

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14 Once confidentiality is breached, the harm is done and cannot be  
15 undone. Plaintiff cannot subsequently perform its commitment to its  
16 clients to protect the confidentiality of the documents and the  
17 information which they contain. There is no way to recapture and  
18 remove from the knowledge of others information improperly disclosed  
19 by Defendant. No court order or specific performance can be framed to  
20 accomplish that end, and no award of money damages will change the  
21 fact that information which Plaintiff was entitled to have kept from the  
22 knowledge of third parties is no longer shielded from their gaze.  
23 Confidentiality, like pregnancy, is an all or nothing proposition; either  
24 it exists or it does not exist.

25 *Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Bishop*, 839 F. Supp. 68, 72 (D. Me.  
1993) (finding irreparable harm). “Once the documents are surrendered,” in other  
words, “confidentiality will be lost for all time. The status quo could never be  
restored.” *Providence Journal Co. v. FBI*, 595 F.2d 889, 890 (1st Cir. 1979); *see*

1 *PepsiCo, Inc. v. Redmond*, 1996 WL 3965, at \*30 (N.D. Ill. 1996) (“[J]ust as it is  
2 impossible to unring a bell, once disclosed, . . . confidential information lose their  
3 secrecy forever”); *Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Usery*, 426 F. Supp. 150, 172 (D.D.C. 1976)  
4 (“Once disclosed, such information would lose its confidentiality forever.”). This is  
5 why, as the D.C. Circuit recently explained, “irreparable injury is frequently found  
6 when a movant seeks to prevent the disclosure of privileged documents pending  
7 litigation. That is generally because the holders of the privileges will, themselves,  
8 be irreparably harmed by release, and time is not of the essence.” *Trump v.*  
9 *Thompson*, 20 F.4th at 47.

### 11 **iii. No Substantial Injury to the Congressional Defendants**

12 The Committee’s harm would be merely a delay in its receipt of documents.  
13 In the analogous FOIA context, an “ ‘interest in receiving the records immediately .  
14 . . poses no threat of irreparable harm’ to them”—at least not a cognizable one. *Cf.*  
15 *Shapiro v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice*, 2016 WL 3023980, at \*7 (D.D.C. May 25, 2016)  
16 (quoting *John Doe Agency v. John Doe Corp.*, 488 U.S. 1306, 1309 (1989)  
17 (Marshall, J., in chambers)). This remains true even when resolution of the merits  
18 will delay government action. *Fund For Animals v. Norton*, 281 F. Supp. 2d 209,  
19 222 (D.D.C. 2003) (rejecting government’s claim of harm in having its action  
20 “delayed for a short period of time pending resolution of this case on the merits”);  
21 *22nd Avenue Station, Inc. v. City of Minneapolis*, 429 F. Supp. 2d 1144, 1152 (D.  
22 Minn. 2006) (delaying implementation of ordinance). In any event, a delay is an  
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1 entirely different class of harm than the permanent disclosure of privileged  
2 information.

#### 3 **iv. Public Interest**

4 Attorney client privilege is a public good. While the individual relationship  
5 benefits an individual client, the possibility of seeking full and frank legal advice  
6 benefits society immensely. Because the privilege “encourage[s] full and frank  
7 communication between attorneys and their clients” it “promote[s] broader public  
8 interests in the observance of law and administration of justice.” *Upjohn Co. v.*  
9 *United States*, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981). To that end, “[t]he privilege recognizes that  
10 sound legal advice or advocacy serves public ends and that such advice or advocacy  
11 depends upon the lawyer's being fully informed by the client.” *Id. cf., e.g., In re Pac.*  
12 *Pictures Corp.*, 679 F.3d 1121, 1127 (9th Cir. 2012) (explaining that a theory of  
13 selective waiver “does little, if anything, to serve the *public good* underpinning the  
14 attorney-client privilege.” (emphasis added)).  
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17 If this privilege is called into doubt, the communication between any client  
18 and among any attorneys will be called into question. Attorneys will no longer be  
19 comfortable to voice doubt at legal or factual claims (doubt which may be resolved  
20 through caveats or discussion with principles) for fear that expressing doubt will  
21 nullify the privilege. Attorneys must be free to probe the weaknesses in their own  
22 arguments without fear of voiding the privilege.  
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Respectfully submitted,

/s/ Charles Burnham

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**CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE**

I have served this filing on all counsel through the Court’s ECF system.

Respectfully submitted,

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