

19-1540-cv

In the United States Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit

DONALD J. TRUMP, DONALD J. TRUMP, JR., ERIC TRUMP, IVANKA TRUMP, DONALD
J. TRUMP REVOCABLE TRUST, TRUMP ORGANIZATION, INC., TRUMP ORGANIZATION
LLC, DJT HOLDINGS LLC, DJT HOLDINGS MANAGING MEMBER LLC, TRUMP
ACQUISITION LLC, TRUMP ACQUISITION, CORP.,

Plaintiffs-Appellants,

v.

DEUTSCHE BANK AG, CAPITAL ONE FINANCIAL CORPORATION,
Defendants-Appellees,

COMMITTEE ON FINANCIAL SERVICES OF THE UNITED STATES HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES, PERMANENT SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE OF THE
UNITED STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,

Intervenor-Defendants-Appellees.

On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of New York

**BRIEF AMICUS CURIAE OF CONSTITUTIONAL ACCOUNTABILITY
CENTER IN SUPPORT OF INTERVENOR-DEFENDANTS-APPELLEES**

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INTEREST OF *AMICUS CURIAE*¹

Amicus Constitutional Accountability Center (CAC) is a think tank, public interest law firm, and action center dedicated to fulfilling the progressive promise of our Constitution’s text, history, and values. CAC works in our courts, through our government, and with legal scholars to improve understanding of the Constitution and preserve the rights, freedoms, and structural safeguards that our nation’s charter guarantees. CAC accordingly has a strong interest in this case and in the scope of Congress’s investigative powers under Article I.

INTRODUCTION

As the Supreme Court has long recognized, “[t]he power of the Congress to conduct investigations is inherent in the legislative process,” and “[t]hat power is broad.” *Watkins v. United States*, 354 U.S. 178, 187 (1957). Indeed, it “is as penetrating and far-reaching as the potential power to enact and appropriate under the Constitution.” *Barenblatt v. United States*, 360 U.S. 109, 111 (1959). Exercising that power, two House Committees, the Committee on Financial Services and the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (“Intelligence Committee”), subpoenaed certain financial documents from Deutsche Bank AG and Capital One

¹ *Amicus* states that no counsel for a party authored this brief in whole or in part, and no person other than *amicus* or its counsel made a monetary contribution to the brief’s preparation or submission. Counsel for all parties have consented to the filing of this brief.

Financial Corporation (“Capital One”) related to President Trump’s, his family’s, and his businesses’ finances. These Committees did so as part of “serious and urgent [investigations] concerning the safety of certain banking practices, money laundering in the financial sector, foreign influence in the U.S. political process, and the counterintelligence threats posed by foreign financial leverage.” House Br. 1.

Plaintiffs sued to block Deutsche Bank and Capital One from complying with the subpoenas, arguing that Congress has no legitimate legislative basis for requesting these documents.² But the Committees’ legitimate legislative basis is plain: information these documents can provide would aid Congress’s determination about whether and how to legislate with respect to lending practices, money laundering, and fraud at financial institutions, as well as conflicts of interest that might exist if foreign actors were to have leverage over President Trump, his family, and his businesses. Plaintiffs’ arguments to the contrary are at odds with decades of Supreme Court precedent and would, if accepted, significantly cabin the scope of Congress’s authority to investigate.

Recognition of Congress’s broad authority to investigate is longstanding. Indeed, the practice of legislative investigations predates the birth of the United States, and that power was exercised by Congress from the beginning of the

² Plaintiffs also argue that the Committees’ subpoenas would violate the Right to Financial Privacy Act. *See* Appellants’ Br. 37-45. This *amicus* brief does not address that issue.

Republic. As early as 1792, Congress investigated a military defeat by “send[ing] for necessary persons, papers and records” from the Washington Administration, and James Madison and other Framers of the Constitution voted in favor of this inquiry. *McGrain v. Daugherty*, 273 U.S. 135, 161 (1927). That investigation was only the first of many other congressional investigations that have followed in the years since.

Consistent with this long history, the Supreme Court has repeatedly affirmed the existence of Congress’s power to investigate and reiterated that the scope of that power is co-extensive with the scope of Congress’s power to legislate. As the Court has explained, Congress’s power to investigate is “broad,” encompassing “inquiries concerning the administration of existing laws as well as proposed or possibly needed statutes” and including “surveys of defects in our social, economic or political system for the purpose of enabling the Congress to remedy them.” *Watkins*, 354 U.S. at 187. In discussing the breadth of Congress’s investigatory power, the Court has made clear that the judiciary should not second-guess the legislature’s judgment as to what investigations will facilitate Congress’s exercise of its legislative power. Thus, courts must uphold a congressional request for records so long as it is not “plainly incompetent or irrelevant to any lawful purpose [of Congress] in the discharge of [its] duties.” *McPhaul v. United States*, 364 U.S. 372, 381 (1960) (quoting *Endicott Johnson Corp. v. Perkins*, 317 U.S. 501, 509 (1943)).

Applying this deferential standard, the district court correctly held that the Committees' requests are valid. The Financial Services Committee's requests for financial documents—following allegations that Deutsche Bank provided more than \$2 billion in loans to President Trump despite bank officials' concerns about those loans, and allegations that shell companies used illicit funds to purchase Trump properties, House Br. 9-12—could produce information that would inform Congress's decision-making about whether to strengthen laws that regulate lending practices of financial institutions and that prevent the use of shell companies. And the Intelligence Committee's request for financial documents—following numerous reports of the intersection between President Trump's business interests and Russia-linked entities—could aid its consideration of legislation that would limit foreign influence in our political process, including financial entanglements of the President.

In fact, Congress is right now considering numerous pieces of legislation that would do just these things. Even though Congress need not point to proposed legislation to justify an investigation so long as the investigation is consistent with Congress's "*potential* power to enact and appropriate under the Constitution," *Barenblatt*, 360 U.S. at 111 (emphasis added), the existence of such proposed legislation underscores the legitimacy of Congress's request for these documents. In short, the Committees' subpoenas are hardly "plainly incompetent or irrelevant to

any lawful [legislative] purpose,” *McPhaul*, 364 U.S. at 381 (quoting *Endicott Johnson Corp.*, 317 U.S. at 509), and therefore must stand.

ARGUMENT

I. LEGISLATIVE INVESTIGATIONS HAVE A LONG HISTORY, BOTH IN THE BRITISH PARLIAMENT AND IN EARLY AMERICAN CONGRESSES.

The practice of legislative oversight predates the birth of the United States, with “roots [that] lie deep in the British Parliament.” James M. Landis, *Constitutional Limitations on the Congressional Power of Investigation*, 40 Harv. L. Rev. 153, 159 (1926). In the 1680s, for example, the British Parliament investigated issues as diverse as the conduct of the army in “sending Relief” into Ireland during war, “Miscarriage in the Victualing of the Navy,” and the imposition of martial law by a commissioner of the East India Company. *Id.* at 162 (internal citation and quotation marks omitted). These investigations were premised on the idea that Parliament could not properly legislate if it could not gather information relevant to the topics on which it wanted to legislate. Thus, for instance, a February 17, 1728 entry in the *Commons’ Journal* described a parliamentary committee’s investigation of bankruptcy laws as follows:

Ordered, That the Committee, appointed to inspect what Laws are expired, or near expiring, and to report their Opinion to the House, which of them are fit to be revived, or continued, and who are instructed to inspect the Laws related to Bankrupts, *and consider what Alterations are proper to be made therein*, have Power to send for Persons, Papers, and Records, with respect to that Instruction.

Id. at 163 (emphasis added) (internal citation omitted).

This early British practice of legislative investigation was replicated by American colonial legislatures. “The colonial assemblies, like the House of Commons, very early assumed, usually without question, the right to investigate the conduct of the other departments of the government and also other matters of general concern brought to their attention.” C.S. Potts, *Power of Legislative Bodies To Punish for Contempt*, 74 U. Pa. L. Rev. 691, 708 (1926). For example, in 1722, the Massachusetts House of Representatives declared that it was “not only their Privilege but Duty to demand of any Officer in the pay and service of this Government an account of his Management while in the Public Employ.” *Id.* (internal citation omitted). In exercising that duty, the House called before it two military officers to question them about their “failure to carry out certain offensive operations ordered by the [H]ouse at a previous session,” over the objection of the Governor. *Id.* Similarly, the Pennsylvania Assembly had “a standing committee to audit and settle the accounts of the treasurer and of the collectors of public revenues,” *id.* at 709, which had the “full Power and Authority to send for Persons, Papers and Records by the Sergeant at Arms of this House,” *id.* (internal citation omitted).

After the nation’s Founding, early state legislatures also understood themselves to have the power to investigate, and even to enforce subpoenas against witnesses. For example, in 1824, the New York House of Representatives appointed

a special committee to investigate corruption at the Chemical Bank and the handling of its charter. In connection with this investigation, the committee required a witness to appear before the committee and adopted the following resolution when he refused:

Resolved, That there was no sufficient ground for his refusal to appear before the committee, and testify; that he was guilty of a misdemeanor and contempt of the House; that the sergeant-at-arms deliver him to the keeper of the jail of the county of Albany; that he be imprisoned until further order of the House, and that the Speaker issue his warrant accordingly.

Id. at 718 (internal citation omitted).

The United States Congress also demonstrated early in the Republic's history that it viewed its authority to investigate broadly. As the Supreme Court would later recount, the first Congresses used compulsory process to investigate "suspected corruption or mismanagement of government officials." *Watkins*, 354 U.S. at 192. For instance, the House created a special committee in March 1792 to inquire into a significant military defeat. Records of the debate in the House show that a majority of Members believed that Congress should establish a select committee to investigate this matter itself, rather than direct the President to investigate. For example, Representative Thomas Fitzsimons believed it "out of order to request the President . . . to institute . . . a Court of Inquiry," and instead argued that a committee was better suited "to inquire relative to such objects as came properly under the cognizance of this House, particularly respecting the expenditures of public money."

3 Annals of Cong. 492 (1792). Similarly, Representative Abraham Baldwin “was convinced the House could not proceed but by a committee of their own,” which “would be able to throw more light on the subject, and then the House would be able to determine how to proceed.” *Id.* Thus, the House rejected a proposal directing the President to carry out the investigation, and instead passed, 44-10, a resolution creating its own investigative committee:

Resolved, That a committee be appointed to inquire into the causes of the failure of the late expedition under Major General St. Clair; and that the said committee be empowered to call for such persons, papers, and records, as may be necessary to assist their inquiries.

Id. at 493. Notably, “Mr. Madison, who had taken an important part in framing the Constitution only five years before, and four of his associates in that work, were members of the House of Representatives at the time, and all voted [in favor of] the inquiry.” *McGrain*, 273 U.S. at 161 (citing 3 Annals of Cong. 494 (1792)). Historical evidence suggests that President Washington cooperated in full with this investigation.³

³ President Washington’s Cabinet agreed that the committee was authorized to make such inquiries, and advised the President that he “ought to comply with the requests of Congress although he had the right to refuse to communicate any papers that would tend to injure the public good.” William Patrick Walsh, *The Defeat of Major General Arthur St. Clair, November 4, 1791: A Study of the Nation’s Response 1791-1793* at 58-59 (February 1977) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Loyola University of Chicago), available at https://ecommons.luc.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2772&context=luc_diss. On April 4, 1792, Congress passed another bill requesting that the President “cause the

Numerous similar congressional investigations took place over the succeeding years. In 1800, a select committee was formed to investigate the circumstances of the Treasury Secretary's resignation. 10 Annals of Cong. 787-88 (1800). Representative Roger Griswold believed such an investigation was important because if there is an investigation "on the retirement of every Secretary of the Treasury from office" about "his official conduct, it will operate as a general stimulus to the faithful discharge of duty." *Id.* at 788. The committee was directed "to examine into the state of the Treasury, the mode of conducting business therein, the expenditures[] of the public money, and to report such facts and statements as will conduce to a full and satisfactory understanding of the state of the Treasury." *Id.* at 796-97.

Early congressional committees also began investigations concerning "the enactment of new statutes or the administration of existing laws." *Watkins*, 354 U.S. at 192-93. For instance, in 1827, the House Committee on Manufactures initiated an investigation to consider a revision of the tariff laws, and sought the power to send for persons and papers in aid of that investigation. This proposal generated substantial debate. Although some members of Congress thought "that the only

proper officers" to produce "such papers of a public nature" as may be necessary for the investigation, 3 Annals of Cong. 536 (1792), and the Washington Administration complied, turning over all relevant documents because none were found to prejudice the public good, Walsh, *supra*, at 59 (citing Letter from President Washington to Henry Knox (April 4, 1792), in XXXII Writings of Washington 15).

cases in which the House has a right to send for persons and papers, are those of impeachment, and of contested elections,” Landis, *supra*, at 178 n.102 (internal citation omitted), other Members believed that where Congress is considering a measure “deeply affecting the interest of every man in the United States,” Congress may “compel the attendance of witnesses who can give . . . practical information upon the subject,” *id.* at 178 n.103 (internal citation omitted). In the end, Congress voted to grant the committee subpoena power. 4 Cong. Deb. 861 (1827).

Some early investigations focused specifically on the President and his Cabinet. For example, in 1832, the House created a committee to discover “whether an attempt was made by the late Secretary of War, John H. Eaton, fraudulently to give to Samuel Houston—a contract—and that the said committee be further instructed *to inquire whether the President of the United States had any knowledge of such attempted fraud*, and whether he disapproved of the same; and that the committee have power to send for persons and papers.” Landis, *supra*, at 179 (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 502, 22d Cong. 1st Sess., Ser. No. 228) (emphasis added). Later, in 1860, Congress created a special committee to determine whether “any person connected with the present Executive Department of this Government,” Cong. Globe, 36th Cong., 1st Sess. 1017-18 (1860), improperly attempted to influence legislation in the House “by any promise, offer, or intimation of employment, patronage, office, favors, or rewards, under the Government, or under

any department, officer, or servant thereof, to be conferred or withheld in consideration of any vote given,” *id.* at 1018. The committee had the “power to send for persons and papers, examine witnesses, and leave to report at any time, by bill or otherwise.” *Id.*

Finally, early Congresses assumed that the individuals who could be held in contempt for refusing to cooperate with investigations were not limited to members of Congress. For example, in 1795, Robert Randall was accused of attempting to bribe three members of the House of Representatives, and was brought before the House, which overwhelmingly approved a resolution finding him guilty of attempting to corrupt the integrity of Members. The resolution ordered Randall to be “brought to the bar, reprimanded by the Speaker, and committed to the custody of the Sergeant-at-Arms until further order of this House.” Potts, *supra*, at 719-20 (internal citation omitted). This case was significant because there was “no division of opinion among the members present, several of whom had been members of the Constitutional Convention, as to the power of the house to punish a non-member for such an offense.” *Id.* at 720.⁴

⁴ This congressional power to punish for contempt was approved by an early Supreme Court decision, *Anderson v. Dunn*, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 204 (1821), in which the Court upheld the Speaker’s warrant for the arrest of an individual who attempted to bribe a Member of the House. *Id.* at 224-35.

Similarly, in 1859, a committee created to investigate the raid on Harper's Ferry attempted to subpoena as a witness Thaddeus Hyatt, and when he refused to appear, the Senate voted on a resolution directing that Hyatt be imprisoned in the House until he was willing to testify. *McGrain*, 273 U.S. at 161-62. The resolution overwhelmingly passed, with numerous Senators speaking in favor of the Senate's power to subpoena witnesses as part of an investigation. Senator William P. Fessenden noted that the subpoena power "has been exercised by Parliament, and by all legislative bodies down to the present day without dispute," and that "the power to inquire into subjects upon which [legislatures] are disposed to legislate" should not be "lost" to the Senate. Cong. Globe, 36th Cong., 1st Sess. 1102 (1860). He believed that Congress's power included the authority "to compel [witnesses] to come before us" where the witness "will not give [information] to us." *Id.* Likewise, Senator John J. Crittenden argued that the Senate has "the power of instituting an inquiry," and that it "ha[s] a right, in consequence of it, a necessary incidental power, to summon witnesses, if witnesses are necessary." *Id.* at 1105.

In short, the power to investigate, and to subpoena relevant witnesses and documents, has been treated as a core congressional power since the early days of the Republic. Since then, Congress has used its subpoena power to investigate a broad range of matters, including the "means used to influence the nomination of candidates for the Senate," *Reed v. Cty. Comm'rs of Delaware Cty., Pa.*, 277 U.S.

376, 386 (1928), alleged “interference with the loyalty, discipline, or morale of the Armed Services,” *Eastland v. U.S. Servicemen’s Fund*, 421 U.S. 491, 500 (1975), the problem of “mob violence and organized crime,” *In re the Application of U.S. Senate Permanent Subcomm. on Investigations*, 655 F.2d 1232, 1233 (D.C. Cir. 1981), and the prevention of “sex trafficking, on the Internet,” *Senate Permanent Subcomm. v. Ferrer*, 199 F. Supp. 3d 125, 128 (D.D.C. 2016), *vacated as moot*, 856 F.3d 1080 (D.C. Cir. 2017). As the next Section discusses, the Supreme Court has repeatedly recognized that this congressional power to investigate is as broad as this history suggests.

II. THE SUPREME COURT HAS CONSISTENTLY AFFIRMED THAT CONGRESS’S POWER TO INVESTIGATE IS COEXTENSIVE WITH ITS POWER TO LEGISLATE.

Consistent with this long history, the Supreme Court has recognized that Congress’s power to investigate is inherent in its power to legislate—and that this power is broad. In *McGrain v. Daugherty*, the Court considered whether the Senate, in the course of an investigation regarding the Department of Justice, could compel a witness—in that case, the Attorney General’s brother—to appear before a Senate committee to give testimony. 273 U.S. at 150-52. The Court held that “the Senate—or the House of Representatives, both being on the same plane in this regard—has power, through its own process, to compel a private individual to appear before it or one of its committees and give testimony needed to enable it efficiently to exercise

a legislative function belonging to it under the Constitution.” *Id.* at 154. As the Court explained, the power to compel witnesses to testify is an essential aspect of the power to legislate:

A legislative body cannot legislate wisely or effectively in the absence of information respecting the conditions which the legislation is intended to affect or change; and where the legislative body does not itself possess the requisite information—which not infrequently is true—recourse must be had to others who do possess it.

Id. at 175.

Applying these principles, the Court then asked whether the particular subpoena at issue was designed “to obtain information in aid of the legislative function.” *Id.* at 176. The Court concluded that it was: “the subject to be investigated was the administration of the Department of Justice—whether its functions were being properly discharged or were being neglected or misdirected” *Id.* at 177. As the Court explained: “Plainly the subject was one on which legislation could be had and would be materially aided by the information which the investigation was calculated to elicit,” *id.*, especially in view of the fact that the powers of the Department of Justice and the Attorney General were subject to legislation. *Id.* at 178.

Two years later, the Court reiterated that “the power of inquiry is an essential and appropriate auxiliary to the legislative function.” *Sinclair v. United States*, 279 U.S. 263, 291 (1929). It thus affirmed an individual’s conviction for contempt of

Congress under 2 U.S.C. § 192, which provides for the criminal punishment of witnesses who refuse to answer questions or provide documents pertinent to a congressional investigation. Rejecting the defendant’s claim that the investigation at issue was not related to legislation, the Court stated that because Congress can legislate “respecting the naval oil reserves” and “other public lands and property of the United States,” a Senate committee “undoubtedly” had the power “to investigate and report what had been and was being done by executive departments under the Leasing Act, the Naval Oil Reserve Act, and the President’s order in respect of the reserves and to make any other inquiry concerning the public domain.” *Id.* at 294.

The Court again outlined a broad view of Congress’s power to investigate in its 1955 decision in another case involving 2 U.S.C. § 192. As in *McGrain*, the Court in *Quinn v. United States*, 349 U.S. 155 (1955), described the breadth of Congress’s investigatory powers:

There can be no doubt as to the power of Congress, by itself or through its committees, to investigate matters and conditions relating to contemplated legislation. This power, deeply rooted in American and English institutions, is indeed co-extensive with the power to legislate. Without the power to investigate—including of course the authority to compel testimony, either through its own processes or through judicial trial—Congress could be seriously handicapped in its efforts to exercise its constitutional function wisely and effectively.

Id. at 160-61. Similarly, in *Watkins v. United States*, the Court made clear yet again that “an investigation is part of lawmaking,” 354 U.S. at 197, and once more described the congressional investigatory power expansively:

The power of the Congress to conduct investigations is inherent in the legislative process. That power is broad. It encompasses inquiries concerning the administration of existing laws as well as proposed or possibly needed statutes. It includes surveys of defects in our social, economic or political system for the purpose of enabling the Congress to remedy them. It comprehends probes into departments of the Federal Government to expose corruption, inefficiency or waste.

Id. at 187. And again, in *Eastland v. U.S. Servicemen’s Fund*, the Court recognized that “the power to investigate is inherent in the power to make laws,” and that the “[i]ssuance of subpoenas . . . has long been held to be a legitimate use by Congress of its power to investigate.” 421 U.S. at 504. Indeed, the Court ruled, the “power of inquiry” is such “an integral part of the legislative process” that the Speech or Debate Clause provides complete immunity for Congressmembers’ decision to issue a subpoena. *Id.* at 505, 507. “The issuance of a subpoena pursuant to an authorized investigation,” as the Court explained, is “an indispensable ingredient of lawmaking.” *Id.* at 505.

Finally, the Court relied on “Congress’ broad investigative power” in upholding a statute that required the preservation of presidential materials from the Nixon Administration. Among the “substantial public interests that led Congress to seek to preserve [these] materials” was “Congress’ need to understand how [our] political processes had in fact operated” during “the events leading to [Nixon]’s resignation . . . in order to gauge the necessity for remedial legislation.” *Nixon v. Adm’r of Gen. Servs.*, 433 U.S. 425, 453 (1977).

In sum, because the scope of its investigatory power is “co-extensive with the power to legislate,” *Quinn*, 349 U.S. at 160, “[t]he power of inquiry has been employed by Congress throughout our history, over the whole range of the national interests concerning which Congress might legislate or decide upon due investigation not to legislate,” *Barenblatt*, 360 U.S. at 111. The subpoenas at issue here are plainly valid exercises of that power, as the next Section discusses.

III. THE COMMITTEES’ REQUESTS FOR FINANCIAL DOCUMENTS IN THIS CASE FALL WELL WITHIN THE SCOPE OF CONGRESS’S INVESTIGATORY POWERS.

As described above, Congress’s power to investigate is “broad,” encompassing “inquiries concerning the administration of existing laws as well as proposed or possibly needed statutes.” *Watkins*, 354 U.S. at 187. And the Supreme Court has made clear that this Court must uphold congressional requests for records so long as they are not “plainly incompetent or irrelevant to any lawful purpose [of Congress] in the discharge of [its] duties.” *McPhaul*, 364 U.S. at 381 (quoting *Endicott Johnson Corp.*, 317 U.S. at 509).

The Committees’ investigations—and the subpoenas they have issued in furtherance of those investigations—plainly satisfy this test. First, the Financial Services Committee has subpoenaed financial records related to President Trump, his family, and his businesses from Deutsche Bank and Capital One. As Chairwoman Maxine Waters explained, the Committee is “investigating the

questionable financing provided to President Trump and The Trump Organization by banks like Deutsche Bank to finance its real estate properties.” 165 Cong. Rec. H2698 (daily ed. Mar. 13, 2019) (statement of Rep. Waters). This investigation will aid the Committee in determining whether and how to strengthen federal banking laws, particularly with respect to lending practices and the prevention of money laundering and loan fraud.

Second, the Intelligence Committee has similarly subpoenaed financial records related to President Trump, his family, and his businesses from Deutsche Bank. These subpoenas further the Committee’s investigation of President Trump’s entanglements with foreign entities following reports of decades of intersection between President Trump’s business interests and Russia-linked entities, including Deutsche Bank—which has links to Russian state institutions. House Br. 9-12. As Chairman Adam Schiff explained, the Committee is gathering information to decide whether and how to “[s]trengthen legal authorities and capabilities for our intelligence and law enforcement agencies to better track illicit financial flows, including through shell companies, real estate and other means; to better identify counterintelligence risks; and to expose interference by foreign actors.” 165 Cong. Rec. H3482 (daily ed. May 8, 2019) (statement of Rep. Schiff).

These subjects of investigation easily fall within Congress’s power to legislate—they are inquiries into the “administration of existing laws as well as

proposed or possibly needed statutes,” *Watkins*, 354 U.S. at 187. The Supreme Court has explained that Congress’s investigatory power includes “surveys of defects in our social, economic or political system for the purpose of enabling the Congress to remedy them,” including defects like “corruption, inefficiency or waste.” *Id.* Thus, as the district court recognized with regard to the Financial Services Committee’s investigation, its “subpoenas seek records relating to individuals and entities, including plaintiffs, that may have served as conduits for illicit funds or may not have been properly underwritten, and the public record establishes that they serve as a useful case study for the broader problems being examined by the committee.” JA133. Likewise, with regard to the Intelligence Committee’s investigation, the district court explained that its subpoena is justified “on the ground that its investigation requires an understanding of Mr. Trump’s complex financial arrangements, including how those arrangements intersect with Russia and other foreign governments and entities.” *Id.* at 134. These legislative interests are hardly “plainly incompetent or irrelevant to any lawful [legislative] purpose.” *McPhaul*, 364 U.S. at 381 (quoting *Endicott Johnson Corp.*, 317 U.S. at 509).

Importantly, Congress need not point to any proposed legislation to justify an investigation. “The very nature of the investigative function—like any research—is that it takes the searchers up some ‘blind alleys’ and into nonproductive enterprises. To be a valid legislative inquiry there need be no predictable end result.” *Eastland*,

421 U.S. at 509. Congress’s investigatory power “is as penetrating and far-reaching as the *potential* power to enact and appropriate under the Constitution.” *Barenblatt*, 360 U.S. at 111 (emphasis added).

Nonetheless, the existence here of specific pieces of legislation that Congress is considering underscores the validity of this investigation. The Financial Services Committee is considering legislation that would increase transparency regarding ownership of anonymous shell corporations. *See, e.g.*, H.R. 2514, 116th Cong. (2019) (making reforms to the Federal Bank Secrecy Act and anti-money laundering provisions); *see also* House Br. 13 (identifying additional proposed legislation). And Congress is also considering legislation that would protect the American political system from foreign influence. *See, e.g.*, H.R. 1, 116th Cong. (2019) (improving election security and oversight and providing for national strategy to combat foreign interference); *see also* House Br. 18-19 (identifying additional proposed legislation).

Plaintiffs insist that this Court should disregard these plainly valid legislative purposes because “courts must discern for themselves what the Committee’s *actual* purpose is through the available evidence.” Appellants’ Br. 25. And here, they say, Congress’s actual purpose is “law enforcement.” *Id.* at 31, 35. This argument contravenes longstanding Supreme Court precedent, which “make[s] clear that in determining the legitimacy of a congressional act [courts] do not look to the motives

alleged to have prompted it.” *Eastland*, 421 U.S. at 508. Said another way, “[s]o long as Congress acts in pursuance of its constitutional power, the Judiciary lacks authority to intervene on the basis of the motives which spurred the exercise of that power.” *Barenblatt*, 360 U.S. at 132. This Court is “bound to presume that the action of the legislative body was with a legitimate object, if it is capable of being so construed.” *McGrain*, 273 U.S. at 178 (quoting *People ex rel. McDonald v. Keeler*, 99 N.Y. 463, 487 (1885)); see *Watkins*, 354 U.S. at 200 (“the motives of committee members . . . alone would not vitiate an investigation which had been instituted by a House of Congress if that assembly’s legislative purpose is being served”).

Plaintiffs discount this clear Supreme Court guidance because, they say, “[t]he difference between ‘purpose’ and ‘motive’ is important,” Appellants’ Br. 25, and the question in this case is “whether the Committees—based on what they are doing and what they have stated—are inappropriately doing something other than legislating,” *id.* at 26. But, as discussed earlier, there is ample evidence that the Committees are engaging in these investigations to facilitate their exercise of legislative power, see *supra* at 17-20, and there is no evidence suggesting that they are gathering evidence to support any law enforcement action against the President. Indeed, the Department of Justice will not bring any law enforcement action against the President because governing Department of Justice guidance prevents it. See *A Sitting President’s*

Amenability to Indictment and Criminal Prosecution, 24 Op. O.L.C. 222 (Oct. 16, 2000).

To be sure, these investigations may have the potential to uncover violations of law, and some members of Congress may have an interest in knowing whether the President has violated the law, Appellants' Br. 2-3, but that does not mean the investigations therefore lack a legitimate legislative purpose. To the contrary, it is possible that the President has violated the law *and* that Congress may wish to legislate on topics related to financial fraud, money laundering, the President's conflicts of interest, and foreign interference in our political system. As Plaintiffs themselves acknowledge, "a permissible legislative investigation does not become impermissible because it might reveal evidence of a crime." *Id.* at 22. Indeed, as the Supreme Court has explained, although Congress "is without authority to compel disclosures for the purpose of aiding the prosecution of pending suits," its authority "to require pertinent disclosures in aid of its own constitutional power is not abridged because the information sought to be elicited may also be of use in such suits." *Sinclair*, 279 U.S. at 295; *see McGrain*, 273 U.S. at 179-80 ("Nor do we think it a valid objection to the investigation that it might possibly disclose crime or wrongdoing on [an executive branch official's] part."); *Hutcheson v. United States*, 369 U.S. 599, 618 (1962) ("[S]urely a congressional committee which is engaged in a legitimate legislative investigation need not grind to a halt . . . when crime or

wrongdoing is disclosed.” (internal citations omitted)); *Townsend v. United States*, 95 F.2d 352, 355 (D.C. Cir. 1938) (“the presumption should be indulged that the object of the inquiry was to aid [Congress] in legislating, . . . even though the investigation might possibly disclose crime or wrongdoing” on the part of an executive branch official).⁵

Plaintiffs note that “[t]he subpoena is . . . laser-focused on the businesses and family members of one person,” which they say is “the hallmark of executive and judicial power, not legislating.” Appellants’ Br. 32 (internal citations omitted). But the President of the United States is no ordinary person. It makes perfect sense that Congress would investigate the President’s finances when it seeks to craft laws regarding foreign interference in our political system. And the Committees’ request for *this* President’s financial information was based on numerous reports regarding the President’s relationship with both Deutsche Bank and Russian interests, as well as allegations that shell companies were misused to purchase Trump properties. *See*

⁵ Plaintiffs cite *United States v. Icardi*, 140 F. Supp. 383 (D.D.C. 1956), in support of their argument that Congress cannot engage in law enforcement, *see* Appellants’ Br. 35, but that court rested its conclusion that a congressional subcommittee was “functioning . . . as a committing magistrate” in large part on a committee report that “state[d] there [wa]s ‘probable cause’ for charging [one of the witnesses] with murder and embezzlement,” *Icardi*, 140 F. Supp. at 387; *see id.* at 388 (noting the “invalidity of the subcommittee’s adjudication of the crime contained in the report’s Statement of Facts”). Significantly, the court in *Icardi* noted that the portion of the investigation with a “bona fide legislative function” was permissible. *Id.* at 387-88.

House Br. 48 (noting “Mr. Trump’s long banking history with Deutsche Bank, his significant loans with the bank, the bank’s reported involvement in money laundering, the fact that other financial institutions have refused to deal with [Mr. Trump], and the reports that Mr. Trump’s properties were purchased with illicit funds”). Thus, the Committees had good reason to believe that information about the President’s businesses may offer illuminating information that will guide its consideration of remedial legislation on all these issues.

Finally, Plaintiffs argue that even if the Intelligence Committee uncovered evidence that foreign actors were using the President’s financial entanglements to influence his decisions as President, “Congress has no [constitutional] power to regulate the President’s finances.” *Id.* at 36. This argument is as astounding as it is wrong. The Supreme Court has made clear that Congress may investigate so long as the investigation is not “*plainly incompetent or irrelevant* to any lawful purpose.” *McPhaul*, 364 U.S. at 381 (internal citation and quotations omitted) (emphasis added). Congressional investigations to determine whether to strengthen laws designed to prevent foreign actors from influencing our nation’s leaders are hardly “plainly incompetent or irrelevant to any lawful [legislative] purpose.” Indeed, Plaintiffs cite no Supreme Court or Second Circuit case that comes close to supporting their suggestion that Congress cannot place any limits on the President’s financial entanglements with foreign entities. Rather, the *only* source that Plaintiffs

cite for this proposition is a letter from then–Deputy Attorney General Laurence H. Silberman to an Assistant to the President in 1974 which suggests—in passing—that there *might* be constitutional questions that arise when applying *some* conflict-of-interest laws to the President. *See* Letter from Laurence H. Silberman, Deputy Att’y Gen. to Richard T. Burrell 2 (Aug. 28, 1974), [bit.ly/31k3rql](https://www.bit.ly/31k3rql) (“[s]ome doubt exists as to the constitutionality of applying [18 U.S.C. § 208(a)] to the President”). And even this letter—again, Plaintiffs’ only support—does not stand for the proposition that *all* laws requiring presidents to arrange their financial holdings in a certain way upon taking office are unconstitutional.

* * *

In sum, Plaintiffs’ arguments, if accepted, would drastically cabin the scope of Congress’s power to investigate. Such a result would be at odds with our nation’s rich history of congressional investigations and with decades of Supreme Court precedent affirming that Congress possesses broad constitutional power to investigate. This Court should reject Plaintiffs’ arguments and affirm the judgment of the district court.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, this Court should hold that the Committees' subpoenas are constitutional.

Respectfully submitted,

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Dated: July 17, 2019

CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE

I hereby certify that this brief complies with the type-volume limitation of Fed. R. App. P. 32(a)(7)(B) and Fed. R. App. P. 29(d) because it contains 6,116 words, excluding the parts of the brief exempted by Fed. R. App. P. 32(a)(7)(B)(iii).

I further certify that the attached brief *amicus curiae* complies with the typeface requirements of Fed. R. App. P. 32(a)(5) and the type-style requirements of Fed. R. App. P. 32(a)(6), because it has been prepared in a proportionally spaced typeface using Microsoft Word 14-point Times New Roman font.

Executed this 17th day of July, 2019.

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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that I electronically filed the foregoing with the Clerk of the Court for the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit by using the appellate CM/ECF system on July 17, 2019.

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Executed this 17th day of July, 2019.

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